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Abstract In many developing countries, access to basic infrastructure services, such as 
sewerage and waste disposal varies considerably across different areas. In this study, Fuzzy-
set Qualitative Comparative Analysis identifies configurations of economic and political 
conditions (population density, population size, income and political participation), associated 
with good and poor access to sewerage and waste disposal in Turkish provinces. The findings 
suggest there is a core configuration of conditions associated with good access to both types 
of infrastructure service – high income and high political participation. A single core 
configuration is associated with poor access to both types of service – low population density, 
small population size and low political participation. Other configurations are observed 
relating specifically to good and poor access to sewerage and to waste disposal services, 
respectively. We theorise the different pathways that we identify, emphasizing that economic 









Infrastructure services play a vital role in sustaining economic growth in developed and 
developing countries alike (Yu et al, 2015). Roads and transportation hubs, sewerage and water 
piping systems, waste management services, and communication networks, all enlarge the 
markets for labour, goods and ideas and lower barriers to trade (Estache and Fay, 2009). 
Despite widespread recognition of the economic and social value of basic infrastructure 
services, considerable variations in access to such services are still experienced by populations 
in low and middle-income countries (Steckel et al, 2017). Critically, local conditions may play 
a key role in shaping access to basic infrastructure (Andres et al, 2014). To cast further light 
on the salience of such conditions, we examine the configurations of population density, 
population size, income level and political participation, associated with good and poor access 
to sewerage and waste services in Turkish provinces.  
Researchers have given increasing consideration to cross-country differences in access 
to basic infrastructure services (e.g. Zezza et al, 2011). However, to date, surprisingly little 
systematic attention has been given to the conditions responsible for variations in infrastructure 
access within developing countries (for rare examples, see Barde, 2017; Rivas, 2012), even 
though the damaging effects of poor access to basic sanitation and waste services are well-
known (Parienté, 2017). We bring together economic and political perspectives on the 
production of public goods to identify configurations of conditions that influence basic 
infrastructure access in Turkish provinces. 
Economic theories of production identify a number of conditions likely to shape access 
to infrastructure services in low and middle income countries, especially levels of population 
density, because rural areas are more remote and therefore suffer from lower investment and 
diseconomies of scope (Rivas, 2012). In addition, communities with a larger population size 
may be able to capture scale economies that enable them to develop better quality infrastructure 
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services (Bird and Bahl, 2013). At the same time, poor households, with a low ability to pay 
for basic infrastructure services, may be unwilling to subsidise those services, whereas 
communities with a high income level may uphold basic water and waste provision themselves 
(Sohail et al, 2005). From a political perspective, communities with high level of political 
participation may be better able to resolve the collective action problems associated with 
influencing decision-makers, and so elicit greater support for the provision of critical 
infrastructure than more disengaged communities (Unger, 1998). 
Although the emerging research investigating sub-national determinants of access to 
basic infrastructure services sheds light on variations in this issue, it has not fully accounted 
for the ways in which different combinations of economic and political conditions might 
account for variations. In this paper, we explore ‘What configurations of economic and political 
conditions are associated with good and poor access to basic infrastructure services in Turkish 
provinces?’ To answer this research question, we employ fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (fsQCA – Ragin, 2008). FsQCA can derive configurational combinations of 
conditions associated with an outcome. Furthermore, in fsQCA ‘causal asymmetry is assumed, 
meaning that the presence and the absence of the outcome, respectively, may require different 
explanations’ (Berg-Schlosser et al, 2009, 9). This means that we are potentially able to identify 
configurations of economic and political conditions associated with good and poor access to 
basic infrastructure services. By capturing different combinations of conditions associated with 
an outcome, researchers using fsQCA are able to capture the complexity of infrastructure 
development in ways that can help policy-makers make more context-sensitive decisions 
(Verweij and Gerrits, 2012).  
In the next part of the paper, we introduce economic and political explanations for 
variations in access to basic infrastructure services in developing countries. Thereafter, the 
economic and political conditions included in our configurational analysis of access to 
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sewerage and waste services are described and the data coding and processing for the fsQCA 




During the past twenty years, policy-makers and researchers have shown increasing interest in 
the reasons behind variations in access to basic infrastructure within, as well as across, low and 
middle-income countries (e.g. Briceño-Garmendia et al, 2004; Lin, 2011). Recently, scholars 
have begun to move beyond linear accounts of the determinants of infrastructure access in sub-
national administrative units (e.g. Barde, 2017; Rivas, 2012), to investigate the combinations 
of conditions responsible for access to infrastructure (e.g. Chai and Schoon, 2016; Roland et 
al, 2018). These studies have cast valuable light on alternative pathways to improved 
infrastructure access, but are often limited to small samples of organizations, including schools 
(e.g. Chatterley et al, 2013; 2014) or community-based projects, especially water wells 
(Gasparro and Walters, 2017; see Gerrits and Verweij 2018, for a review). To better understand 
the complex combinations of context at the heart of the geography of economic and human 
development (Gallup et al, 1999), we need to know more about the salience of different 
configurations of economic and political circumstances across multiple major administrative 
units. In this study, we seek to add to the growing literature on infrastructure access that applies 
configurational analytical techniques, by drawing on four key economic and political 
conditions to capture the variety of provincial geographies that are found in Turkey: economic 





Economic Influences on Infrastructure Access 
Across the developing world, people living in rural, or more remote, areas have poorer access 
to basic infrastructure services, such as water, sanitation and sewerage systems (Briceño-
Garmendia et al, 2004). Aside from the technical difficulties of developing infrastructure 
services in inaccessible places (Gerlitz et al, 2012), more sparsely populated regions generally 
represent a less economically attractive or sustainable market for those services (Wallsten and 
Clarke, 2002). In particular, whereas the provision of basic infrastructure in densely populated 
areas is assumed to benefit from economies of scope and density, the costs of developing 
infrastructure away from urban centres may be higher and susceptible to rapid depreciation 
(Nauges and Van den Berg, 2008).  
Although much of the empirical literature on access to basic services has focused on 
infrastructure provision in rural areas (e.g. Zezza et al, 2011), studies of the relationship 
between population density and basic infrastructure access confirm the basic assumption that 
less densely populated areas have poor service access. For example, Cleary (2007) finds that 
sewerage and water access is better in densely populated Mexican municipalities – a finding 
confirmed in Rivas’ (2012) subsequent study in Mexico focused on water access.  
In addition to the potential scope economies found in more densely populated areas, the 
provision of infrastructure services to larger populations may make infrastructure investments 
more politically and financially attractive to public authorities and private contractors (Bahl 
and Linn, 1992). Coupled with the economic benefits of size, it is also suggested that more 
populous areas are able to mobilise greater political capacity, and clout, than smaller regions, 
and could be less susceptible to corruption and capture by local elites (Prud’Homme, 1995). 
Against the standard arguments in favour of large size, though, proposals for fiscal 
decentralisation in developing countries assume that smaller units of sub-national 
administration are more efficient and responsive to citizens’ needs (Sow and Razafimahefa, 
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2015). Hence, it is conceivable that in some jurisdictions, diseconomies of scale in 
infrastructure provision may predominate. 
A small number of studies furnish evidence of the presence of scale diseconomies in 
infrastructure access (e.g. Cleary, 2007). However, most empirical research tends to support 
the contention that larger territories have the financial and political resources needed for 
infrastructure projects (e.g. Adida and Girod, 2011; Barde, 2017). There is, then, good reason 
to anticipate that conventional arguments about scale economies are likely to be confirmed. 
The relative income level within developing countries may be an important determinant 
of infrastructure access. Wealthy communities have the resources needed to establish and 
maintain basic infrastructure services (Briceño-Garmendia et al, 2004). By contrast, poor 
households may have scant appetite for paying for basic infrastructure (Sohail et al, 2005), and 
less of the human and social capital needed to coproduce its design and maintenance (Button, 
2016; though see Isham and Kähkönen, 1998). In poorer communities, public and private actors 
may therefore have little incentive for developing better basic infrastructure, since citizens in 
economic difficulty may not value it sufficiently to pay for it with either their money or votes 
(Bird and Bahl, 2013).  
The empirical evidence on the link between income and infrastructure access at the 
subnational level in low and middle-income countries is unequivocal: poorer communities have 
much worse access to basic infrastructure. Cleary (2007) finds that sewerage and water access 
is considerably worse in economically disadvantaged Mexican municipalities, while Rivas’ 
(2012) analysis of water access in the same municipalities points towards vast disparities 
between the very poorest and the very richest communities. At the same time, several studies 
highlight how wealthier communities are more likely to participate in the development of 
infrastructure projects (e.g. Prokopy, 2009; Sun et al, 2010), making a positive connection 




Political Influences on Infrastructure Access 
Providers of public goods require the support of citizens and service users (Hirschman, 1970). 
By co-producing public goods and bestowing legitimacy on the providers of goods, people can 
play a vital role in ensuring the on-going sustainability and survival of basic infrastructure 
projects (Isham and Kähkönen, 1998). For this reason, political participation may be an 
especially potent influence on the decision-making of those providers (Azfar et al, 1999). In 
particular, a more active and engaged citizenry may dictate agenda-setting or constrain the 
options available by policy makers (Elkins and Simeon, 1979).  
 Numerous studies indicate that direct participation in, and engagement with, 
infrastructure development projects can be a critical factor influencing success (see Holcombe 
et al, 2018; Isham et al, 1995). Beyond residents’ direct involvement in projects themselves, 
the social capital present within an area has been shown to have a positive influence on 
infrastructure development (e.g. Sun et al, 2010), especially through its effect on participation 
in formal democratic processes. For example, Cleary (2007) finds that electoral turnout is 
positively related to sewerage and water access in Mexican municipalities (see also Adida and 
Girod, 2011). Hence, we assume a positive participation-infrastructure access relationship.  
 
Combined Effects of Economic and Political Influences 
From a configurational perspective, it is necessary to go beyond a straightforward linear 
approach to understand how different combinations of conditions generate contexts that are 
more or less receptive to infrastructure developments (Gerrits and Verweij, 2016). Hence, 
configurations of different economic and political conditions within developing countries seem 
more likely to be an important influence on infrastructure access than the qualities of any given 
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condition in itself - an assumption that lies behind much of the research analysing cross-country 
differences in infrastructure policy (Estache, 2016). 
Although separate economic and political conditions may have important independent 
effects on the provision of infrastructure services, access to those services is likely to depend 
upon the conjunctions between different contextual conditions (Barde, 2017). This is 
particularly likely to be so for population density and size. The scope and scale economies 
associated with the provision of infrastructure services to densely populated and more populous 
areas may vary considerably, depending upon the presence of other favourable economic and 
political conditions. For example, economies of scope may conceivably be more easily realised 
in urban areas with high political participation, because citizens in such areas may be better 
able to resolve the collective action problems required to effectively press public authorities 
and private firms to provide services at a lower cost (Olson, 1989). At the same time, it is 
conceivable that economies of scale will be even greater in wealthy areas, due to the higher 
levels of human capital and technology that can be brought to bear on service development and 
provision (Freeman, 2004).  
Aside from a general expectation that the effects of population density and population 
are particularly likely to be found in combination with other conditions, we have no 
preconceived ideas about the possible combined effects of the economic and political 
conditions that we analyze. Gerrits and Verwij (2016, 18) note that QCA can be used to “both 
explore and test patterns”. Hence, we follow the practice of other researchers employing fsQCA 
(e.g. Schneider and Wagemann, 2010) and adopt an inductive approach to identifying 
configurational relationships between our selected conditions (population density, population 
size, income and political participation) and good and poor access to sewerage and waste 




Data and Methods 
Data for this study were drawn from information collected by the Turkish Statistical Institute 
in 2014 across all 81 provinces of Turkey. Turkish provinces are administered by a provincial 
governor appointed by the national Ministry of Interior who is accorded the right to issue a 
‘general command’ to harmonise provincial policies and practice with those established at the 
national level. Governors are constitutionally required to be politically neutral and have 
authority over a wide range of public institutions within their province, including the police 
force, schools, primary healthcare services, and hospitals. They also have the right to inspect 
the local governments within their province, and to reorganise those administrative units if they 
deem it to be necessary for achieving national policy goals (Akilli and Akilli, 2014).  
In recent times, Turkey has sought to modernise in line with European standards, as 
part of its drive to gain membership of the European Union. Within this context of 
modernisation, reforms intended to encourage regional development, by bringing together key 
actors from within and outside government, have played a critical role. As a result, much of 
the basic infrastructure provision within Turkey has become privatised, giving rise to trenchant 
questions about the equity with which basic services, such as water and sewerage, are provided 
to the population (Cinar, 2009).  
 
Outcomes – Access to Basic Infrastructure Services 
Access to basic infrastructure is still little documented within many low and middle-income 
countries. We are therefore fortunate in being able to draw upon two indicators of access to 
basic infrastructure services within Turkish provinces for our analysis. The first indicator 
measures the percentage of the population provided with a piped system of sewerage. This 
indicator is drawn from the municipal water and wastewater statistics for 2014 published by 
the Turkish Statistical Institute. The second indicator measures the percentage of the population 
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in each province receiving waste collection services. This indicator is drawn from the 
municipal waste statistics for 2014 published by the Turkish Statistical Institute.  
 
Conditions – Economic and Political Factors 
A measure of population density is constructed by dividing information on the population 
living within Turkish provinces from the national census of 2011 by the area of each province 
in square kilometres. This indicator captures potential economies of scope in the delivery of 
infrastructure services. In more densely populated provinces, infrastructure services can be 
shared by local administrations or private firms, and coordinated from a smaller number of core 
sites (Nauges and Van den Berg, 2008).  
The population size of each Turkish province was measured using the census figures of 
2011. Larger provinces may benefit from economies of scale, whereby public and private 
organisations can spread fixed infrastructure costs, and governments themselves may benefit 
from the greater purchasing power accruing to larger entities (Boyne, 1995). Due to the scale 
of their needs and demands, citizens in more populous provinces may also wield greater 
influence over decision-makers than those in smaller communities (Lyons et al, 1992). 
To capture the relationship between wealth and infrastructure access, we measure the 
income level within each Turkish province as the average daily earnings for 2014 in Turkish 
Lira. Higher social needs and lower capacity for the co-production of infrastructure among the 
population may increase the cost of providing infrastructure services in poor communities 
(Briceño-Garmendia et al, 2004). 
Following Putnam (2000) and Cleary (2007), the relative influence of political 
participation on infrastructure access was measured in 2014, as the average turnout in the most 
recent Turkish local government elections within each province. The measure is a useful proxy 
for political participation in the absence of detailed data on attitudes toward engagement with 
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infrastructure development across all Turkish provinces. Descriptive statistics for all the 





Here, fsQCA is used to identify the different configurations of economic and political 
conditions associated with good or poor access to sewerage and waste services in the 81 
provinces of Turkey. QCA was initially developed to compare small sets of qualitative cases 
(Ragin, 1987), but its mathematical grounding means it can handle many more units of analysis 
than a purely qualitative case-based approach (Gerrits and Verweij, 2016). For this reason, 
QCA is especially valuable for investigating complex issues in infrastructure provision, 
because it “strikes a balance between the single-n case study and the qualities of the large-n 
study” (Gerrits and Verweij, 2018, 12). As a set-theoretical analysis technique, it also offers a 
distinctive analytical focus, as stated in Jordan et al (2011, 1171): 
“Statistical regression methods are focused on determining the net, independent effect of 
each variable [condition] on an outcome. In contrast, QCA focuses on combinations of 
configurations that lead to an outcome, not how frequent or likely these configurations 
are.” 
Structural equation modelling and the use of interaction terms in regression modelling 
permit the estimation of complex combined effects of variables on specified outcomes, but to 
do so robustly requires the collection of large quantities of data. Unlike conventional statistical 
techniques, QCA can utilise a comparatively small to medium number of cases to model 
“conjunctural causation” – combinations of causal conditions (e.g. population density and 
political participation), that are linked to an outcome. In addition, QCA facilitates the 
identification of equifinality, where more than one combination may be linked to the same 
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outcome; and causal asymmetry, when appropriate and deficient performance have different 
explanations (Fiss, 2011). It can also identify necessary causal conditions, such that an outcome 
cannot occur without them, as well as sufficient conditions, such that the outcome always 
occurs when a condition is present (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009). Importantly, the technique can 
incorporate INUS logic, whereby it can capture insufficient but necessary conditions which 
may be unnecessary but sufficient for an outcome to occur, such as an electrical short-circuit 
in the case of a house fire (Mackie, 1965).  
FsQCA v2.5 (Ragin et al, 2008) and the QCA-package in R software (see Duşa, 2019) 
were employed to carry out the analysis. Data pre-processing was undertaken using the direct 
method approach to coding (Ragin, 2008). Conditions and outcomes were calibrated to create 
fuzzy membership scores ranging from 0.0 to 1.0. These membership scores were then assessed 
to evaluate the degree to which each province displayed each condition and outcome. 
Following Rihoux and Ragin (2009), qualitative anchors for membership to a condition or 
outcome were initially derived as the, 5th percentile (x - lower-threshold – e.g. definitely poor 
access to waste services), 95th percentile (xT - upper-threshold – e.g. definitely good access to 
waste services) and 50th percentile values (x× - crossover point – e.g. maximum ambiguity 
about whether access to waste services is good or not). These anchors are depicted in 
probability density function (pdf) graphs in Figure 1. Following Andrews et al. (2016), the 
authors evaluated and confirmed the appropriateness of the anchors. 
 
 [Figure 1] 
 
In Figure 1, the solid line shows the constructed pdf for either a condition (a – d) or 
outcome (e and f), with the left hand-side y-axis scale being associated with this pdf.  The three 
vertical dotted lines denote the three threshold and crossover values required for the subsequent 
fuzzy membership score. The dashed line in each graph shows the actual fuzzy membership 
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function, based on the log-odds approach to deriving membership scores from qualitative 
anchor values, with the right hand-side y-axis scale being the 0.0 to 1.0 fuzzy scale.  These 
constructed fuzzy membership score values are analysed using fsQCA, next described. 
 
FsQCA Analysis 
Following Ragin (2008), the fsQCA of Turkish provincial infrastructure access is broken down 
into the necessity and sufficiency analyses, the latter including the construction of a truth table.  
 
Necessity Analysis 
The necessity analysis is premised on the identification of those conditions such that whenever 
the outcome is present the condition is also present, in other words, the outcome cannot be 
achieved without the condition (see Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). It was conducted prior 
to sufficiency analysis, to avoid inappropriately declaring conditions as necessary. The analysis 
presented in Table 2 indicates that we are unable to identify any one condition as a prerequisite 
for any of the outcomes to occur (determined by a consistency value above 0.900 in Table 2, 
see Roig-Tierno et al, 2017). This underlines that it is the combination of different conditions 
that determines infrastructure access. 
 
 [Table 2] 
 
Truth Table Construction 
Following the necessity analysis, sufficiency analysis is undertaken to consider multiple 
conditions (termed conjunctions), which requires establishment of a truth table listing the 
logically possible combinations of causal conditions and the empirical outcomes (here two) 
associated with each configuration (see Ragin, 2008).  With four conditions considered (i.e. 
population density, population size, income and political participation), there are 24 = 16 
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different possible configurations, based on the absence/low (0) or presence/high (1) of the 
condition (in strong membership terms - see Ragin, 2008). The truth table shown in Table 3 
indicates that 15 of the 16 possible configurations have at least one province associated with 
them.  
 
 [Table 3] 
 
To illustrate the relative similarity/difference between the configurations they can be 
plotted in a Venn diagram (see Figure 2). Here, each pair of neighbour configurations differs 
by the absence (0)/ presence (1) of only one condition; for example, the difference between 
configuration 1 (0000) and configuration 2 (0001) is the change from absence to presence of 
high political participation within a province. The Venn diagram clarifies the distribution of 
the provinces associated with each configuration in set-theoretic space, with for example, no 
provinces associated with configuration 12 (1011) and thirteen associated with configuration 
16 (1111). 
 
 [Figure 2] 
  
To understand the spatial variations in configurations of economic and political conditions, 
the geographical distribution of each configuration across Turkey (in terms of strong 
membership) is plotted in Figure 3. The figure suggests that configurations incorporating either 
the absence or presence of all our indicators of favourable economic and political conditions 
tend to be located in Eastern and Western Turkey respectively, reflecting, to some extent, the 
East-West divide in development within the country (Celebioglu and Dall’erba, 2010).    
 




Following Greckhamer (2011), we use fsQCA to investigate those configurations 
(causal combinations) associated with either good or poor access to sewerage and waste 
services (causal asymmetry). This analysis produces consistency (and PRI) scores, shown in 
the far right four columns in Table 3, indicating the strength of the relationship of a 
configuration separately to the high and low outcome forms (see Ragin, 2008; Schneider and 
Wagemann, 2012). To preclude a configuration from being associated with both good and poor 
infrastructure access, as per Table 3, a consistency threshold is applied (following Andrews et 
al, 2016). Configurations with consistency values above the respective thresholds are shown 
in bold in the truth table. Following this we also apply a PRI score threshold of 0.700 
(Greckhamer et al, 2018), with pertinent values shown in bold. 
In addition, we apply a frequency threshold of more than one case per configuration to 
ensure that multiple provinces are considered for each solution in the sufficiency analysis (see 
Kraus et al, 2018). The frequency threshold increases our number of remainders, truth table 
rows (configurations) that lack the evidence needed for a test of sufficiency (see Schneider and 
Wagemann, 2012, 152). Alternative assumptions regarding the remainders underpin the 
parsimonious and complex solutions are discussed below. 
 
Sufficiency Analysis 
The sufficiency analysis undertaken here considers those conditions, or sets of conditions, 
which always lead to the outcome, but may not be the only causal combination to achieve the 
outcome (see Roig-Tierno et al, 2017).  Sufficiency analyses are presented in Tables 4 and 5 
showing good and poor access to sewerage and waste services, respectively.  
Each of the columns shown in the top part of the tables represents an alternative causal 
combination of conditions linked to the respective high (good) or low (poor) outcome.  Both 
the parsimonious and complex fsQCA solutions are presented. Specifically, for the complex 
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solutions, GSC1-3 and PSC1-2 are the combinations associated with good and poor sewerage 
access and GWC1-5 and PWC1-2 with good and poor waste services (similar combinations 
exist for parsimonious solutions). While the parsimonious solution relies on the simplifying 
assumption that all remainders are potential counter-factual cases, the complex solution treats 
them as “false” cases as they are not present within the data (see Ragin, 2008). 
Within the combinations shown in Tables 4 and 5, full circles ( ) indicate the presence 
of a condition, while barred circles ( ) indicate a condition’s absence.  Further, larger circles 
indicate core conditions that are part of both parsimonious and complex solutions, with smaller 
circles indicating peripheral conditions that only occur in complex solutions.  The middle parts 
of the table detail the consistency (and PRI) and coverage values for the complex solution. The 
bottom part of a table offers similar information based on the parsimonious solutions (e.g. 
incorporating only core conditions, indicated by large circles).  
 Fiss (2011) argues that it is important to distinguish between the core and peripheral 
combinations of causal conditions in a set-theoretic analysis. Core causal conditions are those 
“for which the evidence indicates a strong causal relationship with the outcome of interest” 
(Fiss, 2011, 398). By contrast, peripheral causal conditions are those for which the causal 
relationship is weaker. We draw upon the notion of core and peripheral conditions in causal 
combinations to explore the results of our sufficiency analyses in more detail. 
The sufficiency analysis presented in Table 4 identifies three parsimonious solutions 
for good access to sewerage. The first causal combination (GSP1 - GSC1) incorporates the two 
core conditions of high income and political participation. The second causal combination 
(GSP2 - GSC2) incorporates the core conditions of a high population density and large 
population size, while the third combination (GSP3 - GSC3) comprises a large population size 
and high political participation. These findings highlight that there may be more than one path 




 [Table 4] 
 
In terms of peripheral conditions associated with good sewerage access, Table 4 
suggests that in GSC1, provinces that are wealthy and politically active are also likely to have 
good access if they are sparsely populated. Figure 4a maps the eleven provinces that exhibit 
this complex solution, highlighting that they tend to be located in the Western more developed 
part of Turkey, inland of densely populated coastal areas. This implies that rural, wealthy, 
activist provinces may be able to overcome diseconomies of scope and inland transportation 
costs if they are located near to core (in this case European) markets (Gallup et al, 1999). For 
GSC2, the large number of densely and heavily populated provinces with good sewerage access 
are mostly located around the coast of Turkey (see Figure 4b). The improved productivity and 
better transportation links associated with coastal proximity (Rappaport and Sachs, 2003) may 
therefore be especially beneficial for infrastructure access in large, urban provinces. Finally, 
for GSC3, the core conditions of a large population and high political participation are not 
supplemented with any peripheral conditions. For this reason, numerous provinces (twenty-six 
in total) exhibit this pathway to good sewerage access. Figure 4c indicates that while these 
provinces are distributed across coastal and inland parts of Turkey, they are mostly located in 
the Western more developed half of the country, pointing towards the potential for strong 
institutional path dependency to matter for infrastructure services in large, activist provinces 
(Rodrik et al, 2004). 
 
 [Figure 4] 
 
Turning to the configurations associated with poor sewerage access, Table 4 highlights 
that the complex and parsimonious solutions are identical for poor sewerage access, and so will 
be discussed simultaneously. PSC1 is composed of three core conditions: low population 
density, small population size and weak political participation. For PSC2, there are two core 
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conditions: small population size and low income. These results again draw particular attention 
to the issue of scale economies in the provision of basic infrastructure.  
There are seventeen small, rural, non-activist provinces associated with PSC1. Figure 
4d indicates that these provinces are largely located in the less developed north-eastern part of 
Turkey, underlining the challenges of improving infrastructure provision in areas distant from 
core markets (Gallup et al, 1999). Figure 4e shows that the fifteen small, poor provinces 
associated with PSC2 are largely located away from the coast and in the more mountainous 
central parts of the country that may be less accessible or financially attractive for large-scale 
development projects (Gerlitz et al, 2012). 
The sufficiency analysis presented in Table 5 reveals four parsimonious solutions for 
good access to waste services. The first causal combination (GWP1 - GWC1) precisely mirrors 
that for sewerage access, comprising the two core conditions of high income and political 
participation, signalling that wealthy, activist provinces are likely to have the best infrastructure 
access overall – something that would be interesting to explore in other settings in developing 
countries. GWP2 (GWC2) incorporates the core conditions of high population density and 
political participation, while GWP3 (GWC3) comprises high population density and high 
income. The fourth causal combination (GWP4 - GWC4 and GWC5) consists solely of the 
core condition of a large population size. Hence, it would seem that in some areas the potential 
presence of scale economies may be enough to generate efforts to improve basic infrastructure 
access, while economies of scope may only influence such decisions when other considerations 




In terms of peripheral conditions associated with good waste access, Table 5 confirms 
that for GWC1, like GSC1, eleven rural, wealthy, activist provinces appear to have good access 
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to waste services (see also Figure 5a). For GWC2, there are twenty-four politically active and 
densely populated provinces, but with low income that have good waste access. Nearly all these 
poor, urban, activist provinces are located on the Western coastal belt of Turkey, though there 
are some important exceptions, especially Ankara (see Figure 5b). These findings point to the 
role that transportation and communication links and a strong capacity for political 
mobilisation may play in shaping infrastructure access in urban areas (Schubeler, 1996). 
In the case of GWC3, the core conditions of high population and high income are 
supplemented with the peripheral condition of low political participation. Only five large, 
wealthy, non-activist provinces exhibit this causal combination, all of which are located 
towards the Eastern part of Turkey (see Figure 5c). For areas such as these located far from 
core markets and coastal communications, their economic clout may mean they are nonetheless 
attractive for infrastructure development (Freeman, 2004). Figure 5d indicates that GWC4 
combines the peripheral condition of low income with the core one of high population, while 
Figure 5e shows that GWC5 combines high population with the peripheral condition of high 
political participation. Nearly all of the twenty-six large, activist provinces associated with 
GWC5 are located in the Western half of Turkey, but most of the eight large, poor provinces 
uniquely associated with GWC4 are found in the South-Eastern Anatolian region of the country 
that borders Syria and comprises a large Kurdish population. Despite the poverty of the region, 
the geopolitical complexities and conflict with which it has frequently been beset make it 
strategically important, and it has benefitted from large-scale investment in infrastructure 







The results presented in Table 5 indicate that the configurations associated with poor waste 
service access are similar to those for poor sewerage access, with two causal combinations 
associated with weak access to both types of basic infrastructure service. Again, the complex 
and parsimonious solutions are the same, and so can be discussed simultaneously. PWP1 
(PWC1) is identical to PSP1, with three core conditions: low population density, low 
population and weak political participation. For PWP2 (PWC2), the two core conditions of 
small population size and low income are supplemented with one further core conditions: low 
population density. While this latter finding is suggestive of the possibility that the absence of 
scope economies might make waste service provision unattractive, the provinces associated 
with PWP1 and PWP2 are the same as those associated with the two combinations associated 




In this paper, we find that the subnational conditions influencing access to basic infrastructure 
services are only associated with good or poor access when they are present in combination, 
most often as a pairing of two key conditions. In particular, wealthy, activist provinces in 
Turkey appear likely to have good access to both sewerage and waste services. By contrast, 
rural, small, non-activist provinces seem to have worse access to both types of basic 
infrastructure. Our mapping of the causal combinations produced by our fsQCA also revealed 
distinctive regional patterns in infrastructure access within Turkey. These findings have 
important theoretical and practical implications.   
The study builds on the growing literature examining infrastructure access in low and 
middle-income countries in a number of important ways. First, it provides a comprehensive 
subnational analysis of the factors influencing access to basic infrastructure services within a 
single country. Previous research has tended to focus on large-scale aggregated cross-country-
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comparisons of infrastructure access (e.g. Steckel et al, 2017) or evaluations of small samples 
of organizations (e.g. Chatterley et al, 2014). By identifying different configurations of 
economic and political factors shaping access to sewerage and waste services across all the 
provinces of Turkey, we are able to present an in-depth understanding of the context behind 
variations in infrastructure access within developing countries. Second, our study investigates 
the relationship between configurations of economic and political factors and infrastructure 
access. Most prior work at the subnational level has been limited to the analysis of linear 
relationships between selected factors (e.g. Rivas, 2012) or is focused solely on rural areas (e.g. 
Barde, 2017). Our approach provides a detailed picture of the complex combination of 
contextual influences on infrastructure access across all the administrative divisions of a 
middle-income country. Third, the analysis focuses on poor, as well as good, access to basic 
infrastructure services. By empirically testing the possibility that the conditions shaping 
infrastructure access may vary according to whether that access is at the top or the bottom of 
the distribution, we illustrate that good and poor access to basic infrastructure may have unique 
antecedents. 
In addition to speaking to important theoretical and empirical concerns within the 
development literature, our findings cast valuable light on how contextual influences shape 
infrastructure decision-making within developing countries. In particular, because low and 
middle-income countries confront severe budget constraints, the political attractiveness of 
undertaking visible ‘big development’ projects, such as bridges and hydroelectric dams, may 
outweigh the economic costs associated with creating and maintaining basic infrastructure, 
such as sewerage and waste services. Econometric estimates suggest that social rates of return 
to water and sanitation infrastructure may be lower than for energy, transportation and 
communication (Briceño-Garmendia et al, 2004). Our analysis confirms that while political 
factors may play a role in the decision to develop basic infrastructure services, such decisions 
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are unlikely to be made separate from wider economic factors, such as the income level of the 
population, and, critically, the potential for realising economies of scale and scope (see also 
Burrier, forthcoming). Initiatives to overcome the economic disadvantages experienced by 
small, rural or poor communities in low and middle-income countries may therefore hold the 
key to generating interest in and commitment to the enhancement of basic infrastructure 
(Barde, 2017). Nonetheless, efforts to support civic activism by provincial governments and 
Non-Governmental Organizations may help to ensure that local populations are able to 
effectively voice their concerns about infrastructure provision. 
Although these findings offer insights into sub-national variations in infrastructure 
access, the study has limitations that could be addressed through further research. First, our 
results are based on a single cross-section of data. Longitudinal studies could examine the 
causal dynamics behind the pathways that we identify. For instance, by analysing whether good 
or poor infrastructure access lead to changes in economic and political conditions, which, in 
turn influence changes in access to basic infrastructure services. Second, we draw upon a 
measure of political participation that may not capture the actual engagement of citizens with 
policy decisions pertaining to infrastructure. Survey-based measures capturing the political 
behaviour of people across local areas could potentially address this limitation. Third, while 
we provide a parsimonious account of the different causal combinations that may account for 
variations in infrastructure access, other conditions may be important, such as economic 
growth, education level, or party control. Further analysis focused on these conditions could 
identify other pathways to access to basic infrastructure services. Finally, we focus on the case 
of Turkey, a middle-income country that has unique economic and political characteristics. In 
particular, high electoral participation and a unique transcontinental location between the East 
and the West. fsQCA investigations in other countries, would therefore illuminate the 
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generalisability of the spatial configurations of access to basic infrastructure services that we 
identify here.  
 In summary, our study illustrates that complex combinations of context influence 
infrastructure access and that the salience of those combinations may varying according to 
whether access is good or poor. Future research should therefore develop a rounded picture of 
the multiple ways in which economic and political factors interact to contribute to, or detract 
from, the provision of basic infrastructure services in developing countries. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Min Max SD 
Population with access to 





Population receiving waste 





Population density*  124.728 12.000   (Tunceli) 
2821.000 
(İstanbul) 0.851 
Population size*  920070.321 76859 (Bayburt) 
13565798 
(İstanbul) 0.941 






Political participation – average 


























Cons Cov Cons Cov  Cons Cov Cons Cov 
Population density 0.746 0.825 0.543 0.511 
 
0.740 0.867 0.507 0.444 
~Population density 0.558 0.589 0.814 0.732 
 
0.526 0.588 0.848 0.709 
Population size 0.796 0.886 0.498 0.471 
 
0.768 0.904 0.471 0.415 
~Population size 0.525 0.551 0.879 0.786 
 
0.504 0.560 0.891 0.741 
Income 0.672 0.775 0.565 0.554 
 
0.631 0.770 0.571 0.521 
~Income 0.613 0.624 0.771 0.666 
 
0.608 0.655 0.749 0.602 
Political 
participation 0.755 0.758 0.618 0.527  0.723 0.769 0.609 0.484 
~Political 







Table 3: Configurations and consistency values 
 
 Conditions  Regions Raw Consistency (and PRI) Values 





 Access rate of population to sewerage 
and pipe system 
Percentage of population receiving 
waste services 
Access ~Access Receive ~Receive 
1 0 0 0 0 8 Aksaray, Ardahan, Bayburt, Bingöl, Bitlis, Giresun, Iğdır, Sinop, 0.661 (0.153) 0.937 (0.843) 0.673 (0.248) 0.888 (0.743) 
2 0 0 0 1 7 Amasya, Burdur, Isparta, Karaman, Kastamonu, Nevşehir, Niğde 0.814 (0.265) 0.911 (0.646) 0.814 (0.392) 0.848 (0.848) 
3 0 0 1 0 9 Artvin, Erzincan, Gümüşhane, Hakkari, Kars, Muş, Siirt, Tunceli, Yozgat 0.720 (0.215) 0.917 (0.768) 0.713 (0.285) 0.885 (0.885) 
4 0 0 1 1 8 Bilecik, Bolu, Çanakkale, Çankırı, Karabük, Kırıkkale, Kırklareli, Kırşehir, 0.889 (0.582) 0.840 (0.399) 0.869 (0.612) 0.793 (0.793) 
5 0 1 0 0 2 Ağrı, Van 0.856 (0.535) 0.834 (0.465) 0.867 (0.635) 0.767 (0.365) 
6 0 1 0 1 4 Afyonkarahisar, Çorum, Konya, Tokat 0.931 (0.734) 0.805 (0.244) 0.919 (0.757) 0.740 (0.226) 
7 0 1 1 0 1 Erzurum 0.873 (0.597) 0.811 (0.403) 0.873 (0.646) 0.767 (0.349) 
8 0 1 1 1 3 Eskişehir, Kütahya, Sivas 0.955 (0.837) 0.769 (0.156) 0.940 (0.823) 0.716 (0.170) 
9 1 0 0 0 2 Kilis, Şırnak 0.802 (0.301) 0.914 (0.698) 0.820 (0.499) 0.821 (0.501) 
10 1 0 0 1 5 Bartın, Düzce, Edirne, Osmaniye, Uşak 0.883 (0.381) 0.928 (0.619) 0.884 (0.588) 0.835 (0.412) 
11 1 0 1 0 2 Rize, Yalova 0.849 (0.464) 0.869 (0.536) 0.867 (0.516) 0.789 (0.386) 





13 1 1 0 0 8 Adıyaman, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Malatya, Mardin, Ordu, Şanlıurfa, Trabzon 0.880 (0.706) 0.708 (0.286) 0.912 (0.824) 0.591 (0.176) 
14 1 1 0 1 6 Aydın, Balıkesir, Denizli, Kahramanmaraş, Mersin, Samsun 0.967 (0.897) 0.706 (0.096) 0.962 (0.912) 0.606 (0.088) 
15 1 1 1 0 3 Adana, Batman, Elazığ, 0.904 (0.732) 0.740 (0.268) 0.921 (0.813) 0.655 (0.187) 
16 1 1 1 1 13 
Ankara, Antalya, Bursa, Hatay, İstanbul, 
İzmir, Kayseri, Kocaeli, Manisa, Muğla, 
Sakarya,  Tekirdağ, Zonguldak 
0.976 (0.952) 0.518 (0.046) 0.974 (0.955) 0.450 (0.045) 
Consistency threshold  > 0.883 > 0.835 
PRI threshold (after consistency threshold)  > 0.700 > 0.700 
Frequency Threshold  > 1 > 1 





Table 4: Sufficiency analyses for sewerage access (including complex and parsimonious solutions) 
 




















Complex Solution GSC1 GSC2 GSC3 PSC1 PSC 2 
Configurations 4, 8 13, 14, 15, 16 6, 8, 14, 16 1, 3 1, 2, 9, 10 
Consistency (PRI) 0.889 (0.678) 0.911 (0.849) 0.943 (0.893) 0.906 (0.801) 0.888 (0.755) 
Raw Coverage 0.378 0.678 0.622 0.577 0.712 
Unique Coverage 0.080 0.125 0.043 0.091 0.227 
Solution Consistency (PRI) 0.876 (0.790) 0.873 (0.745) 
Solution Coverage 0.828 0.804 
Parsimonious Solution GSP1 GSP2 GSP 3 PSP1 PSP2 
Configurations 4, 8, 16 13, 14, 15, 16 6, 8, 14, 16 1, 3 1, 2, 9, 10 
Consistency 0.896 (0.802) 0.911 (0.849) 0.943 (0.893) 0.906 (0.801) 0.888 (0.755) 
Raw Coverage 0.568 0.678 0.622 0.577 0.712 
Unique Coverage 0.090 0.125 0.038 0.091 0.227 
Solution Consistency (PRI) 0.865 (776) 0.873 (0.745) 
Solution Coverage 0.838 0.804 





Table 5: Sufficiency analyses for waste services access (including complex and parsimonious solutions) 
 
Conditions Good waste services access Poor waste services 
access*  
Population density 




   
    
Income 









Complex Solution GWC1 GWC2 GWC3 GWC4 GWC5 PWC1 PWC2 
Configurations 4, 8 10, 14 11, 15 5, 6, 13, 14 6, 8, 14, 16 1, 3 1, 2 
Consistency (PRI) 0.867 (0.678) 0.902 (0.779) 0.886 (0.756) 0.887 (0.793) 0.939 (0.897) 0.872 (0.746) 0.863 (0.691) 
Raw Coverage 0.349 0.396 0.300 0.507 0.585 0.596 0.643 
Unique Coverage 0.061 0.023 0.020 0.082 0.139 0.102 0.149 
Solution Consistency (PRI) 0.854 (0.771) 0.854 (0.706) 
Solution Coverage 0.812 0.745 
Parsimonious Solution GWP1 GWP2 GWP3 GWP4 PWP1 PWP2 
Configurations 4, 8, 16 10, 14, 16 11, 15, 16 5, 6, 8, 13, 14, 15, 16 1, 3 1,2 
Consistency (PRI) 0.888 (0.809) 0.925 (0.868) 0.910 (0.855) 0.904 (0.857) 0.872 0.863 
Raw Coverage 0.532 0.575 0.512 0.768 0.596 0.643 
Unique Coverage 0.056 0.025 0.015 0.169 0.102 0.296 
Solution Consistency (PRI) 0.844 (0.769) 0.854 (0.706) 
Solution Coverage 0.891 0.745 




        
 
        
 
        
 






























        
 






     
 




     
 





Table A1: Calibrated data matrix 









1 0.842 0.923 0.634 0.440 0.916 0.954 
2 0.626 0.569 0.197 0.343 0.349 0.250 
3 0.335 0.638 0.243 0.942 0.452 0.438 
4 0.313 0.538 0.437 0.005 0.081 0.095 
5 0.346 0.346 0.393 0.354 0.425 0.527 
6 0.411 0.272 0.233 0.893 0.379 0.351 
7 0.907 0.981 0.960 0.867 0.961 0.962 
8 0.729 0.919 0.659 0.724 0.886 0.959 
9 0.055 0.032 0.254 0.123 0.012 0.009 
10 0.068 0.080 0.910 0.396 0.147 0.154 
11 0.797 0.766 0.242 0.846 0.899 0.956 
12 0.610 0.808 0.428 0.901 0.879 0.881 
13 0.656 0.101 0.295 0.514 0.051 0.031 
14 0.766 0.512 0.644 0.134 0.523 0.600 
15 0.055 0.016 0.213 0.313 0.213 0.169 
16 0.324 0.119 0.922 0.957 0.707 0.703 
17 0.142 0.190 0.266 0.119 0.180 0.150 
18 0.313 0.289 0.322 0.105 0.156 0.134 
19 0.171 0.210 0.587 0.846 0.406 0.284 
20 0.202 0.176 0.376 0.950 0.265 0.295 
21 0.939 0.947 0.851 0.835 0.970 0.964 
22 0.357 0.481 0.574 0.846 0.304 0.218 
23 0.075 0.089 0.608 0.690 0.422 0.343 
24 0.235 0.524 0.152 0.634 0.431 0.385 
25 0.621 0.746 0.173 0.961 0.899 0.962 
26 0.729 0.877 0.339 0.047 0.958 0.921 
27 0.810 0.297 0.165 0.885 0.191 0.191 
28 0.501 0.374 0.191 0.771 0.473 0.503 
29 0.516 0.543 0.512 0.313 0.614 0.684 
30 0.043 0.132 0.825 0.485 0.544 0.602 
31 0.123 0.681 0.680 0.233 0.970 0.654 
32 0.442 0.679 0.916 0.846 0.946 0.960 
33 0.943 0.896 0.163 0.188 0.916 0.963 
34 0.463 0.399 0.045 0.323 0.172 0.213 
35 0.075 0.047 0.639 0.070 0.432 0.297 
36 0.213 0.203 0.593 0.028 0.020 0.141 
37 0.935 0.865 0.618 0.595 0.872 0.953 
38 0.379 0.102 0.079 0.156 0.051 0.177 
39 0.346 0.389 0.293 0.811 0.557 0.522 
40 0.999 0.997 0.972 0.634 0.971 0.964 
41 0.961 0.973 0.843 0.798 0.955 0.960 
42 0.569 0.782 0.358 0.756 0.819 0.946 
43 0.422 0.139 0.736 0.653 0.573 0.556 
44 0.098 0.156 0.190 0.835 0.468 0.572 
45 0.114 0.249 0.560 0.093 0.036 0.025 
46 0.106 0.322 0.418 0.672 0.123 0.095 
47 0.587 0.829 0.532 0.824 0.955 0.963 
48 0.651 0.044 0.019 0.474 0.479 0.438 
49 0.442 0.296 0.941 0.595 0.863 0.824 
50 0.390 0.141 0.814 0.876 0.647 0.648 
51 0.181 0.210 0.655 0.615 0.568 0.619 
52 0.980 0.881 0.998 0.885 0.968 0.965 
53 0.390 0.919 0.306 0.771 0.938 0.960 
54 0.313 0.547 0.701 0.921 0.523 0.482 
55 0.501 0.664 0.127 0.323 0.856 0.955 
56 0.711 0.845 0.817 0.976 0.938 0.959 
57 0.646 0.669 0.044 0.101 0.799 0.939 
58 0.739 0.888 0.424 0.634 0.899 0.947 
59 0.536 0.706 0.558 0.835 0.776 0.933 
60 0.346 0.389 0.633 0.047 0.036 0.039 
61 0.368 0.220 0.060 0.835 0.447 0.505 
62 0.301 0.291 0.139 0.932 0.310 0.445 
63 0.766 0.645 0.094 0.304 0.344 0.845 
64 0.853 0.475 0.226 0.690 0.455 0.583 
65 0.615 0.271 0.539 0.175 0.180 0.279 
66 0.892 0.726 0.822 0.901 0.699 0.964 
67 0.813 0.829 0.349 0.595 0.559 0.798 
40 
 
68 0.695 0.892 0.141 0.304 0.639 0.786 
69 0.432 0.253 0.528 0.375 0.309 0.305 
70 0.171 0.119 0.108 0.304 0.111 0.080 
71 0.523 0.440 0.050 0.241 0.314 0.401 
72 0.061 0.592 0.744 0.514 0.479 0.439 
73 0.828 0.700 0.883 0.846 0.879 0.964 
74 0.442 0.568 0.146 0.690 0.428 0.453 
75 0.854 0.669 0.201 0.276 0.764 0.962 
76 0.014 0.020 0.758 0.086 0.276 0.253 
77 0.501 0.295 0.129 0.908 0.358 0.441 
78 0.411 0.784 0.443 0.042 0.899 0.949 
79 0.940 0.122 0.679 0.156 0.817 0.836 
80 0.123 0.453 0.629 0.128 0.410 0.368 
81 0.874 0.584 0.999 0.514 0.280 0.345 
 
 
